JCPOA Implementation Day Guidance: Section VII (US Legal Authorities Post-Implementation Day)

Or… “What's left of US sanctions on Iran”…

VII.

Key U.S. Legal Authorities That Remain in Place After Implementation Day

A number of U.S. legal authorities that are outside the scope of the JCPOA and are directed
toward, or have been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to, Iran remain in place after
Implementation Day. A non-exhaustive list of such authorities is set out below:

A. Trade Sanctions

1. Trade Embargo: The U.S. domestic trade embargo imposed on Iran under the
national emergency declared in E.O. 12957, as implemented through the ITSR, also referred to as U.S. primary sanctions, remains in place following Implementation Day. Pursuant to the ITSR and with limited exceptions,
persons, as defined in section 560.314 of the ITSR, continue to be broadly
prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings directly or indirectly with
Iran or its government. In addition, non-U.S. persons continue to be prohibited
from knowingly engaging in conduct that seeks to evade U.S. restrictions on
transactions or dealings with Iran or that causes the export of goods or services
from the United States to Iran

Please note that, under the ITSR, the clearing of transactions involving Iran
through the U.S. financial system, including foreign branches of U.S. financial
institutions continues to be prohibited

2. Export Controls: U.S. controls on the exportation or reexportation of goods,
technology, and services to Iran imposed pursuant to the ITSR, including sections
560.204 and 560.205, as well as the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R.
parts 730-774 (EAR), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR
parts 120-130 (ITAR), remain in place. Pursuant to these authorities and unless
exempt from regulation or authorized under the relevant regulations, the
exportation or reexportation by a U.S. person or from the United States to Iran or
the Government of Iran, as well as the reexportation by non-U.S. persons of items
that contain 10 percent or more U.S.-controlled content with knowledge or reason
to know that the reexportation is intended specifically to Iran or the Government
of Iran, generally requires a license

B. Designation Authorities and Blocking Sanctions

In addition, the United States retains a number of authorities that are directed toward, or have
been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to Iran. Generally, these authorities provide for
the imposition of blocking sanctions on persons meeting certain criteria or engaging in specified
conduct, as well as their support networks.

Designation authorities:

The activities targeted by these authorities include:

1. Support for terrorism: E.O. 13224 (blocking property and prohibiting transactions
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism);

2. Iran’s human rights abuses:

• E.O.s 13553 and 13628 (implementing sections 105, 105A, and 105B of
  CISADA (related to persons who are responsible for or complicit in
  human rights abuses committed against the citizens of Iran; transfers of
  goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to commit serious
  human rights abuses against the people of Iran; and persons who engage in
  censorship or similar activities with respect to Iran)); and
• E.O. 13606 (relating to the provision of information technology used to
  further serious human rights abuses)

3. Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, including ballistic missiles: E.O.s 12938 and 13382

4. Support for persons involved in human rights abuses in Syria or for the
Government of Syria: E.O.s 13572 and 13582

5. Support for persons threatening the peace, security, or stability of Yemen: E.O.
13611

6. Transactions or activities described in section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA if the
transaction involves any person on the SDN list (other than an Iranian financial
institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to
E.O. 13599): Section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA

7. Diversion of goods intended for the people of Iran: CISADA 105C, as added by
section 1249 of IFCA (relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural
commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of
Iran, or the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of such goods)

8. Knowingly and directly providing specialized financial messaging services to, or
knowingly enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to such messaging
services for a financial, institution whose property or interests in property are
blocked in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of 97
delivery, or Iran's support for international terrorism: Section 220 of the TRA;

9. Officials, agents, and affiliates of the IRGC: Section 301 of the TRA98 (providing
for the designation of officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC); and

10. Foreign sanctions evaders: E.O. 13608 (authorizing the imposition of prohibitions
on transactions or dealings by U.S. persons involving persons determined to have:
(i) violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of
U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran or Syria (including sanctions imposed under
counter-proliferation or counter-terrorism authorities); or (ii) facilitated deceptive
transactions for or on behalf of any person subject to U.S. sanctions concerning
Iran or Syria).99

Blocking authorities:

The persons targeted by these authorities include:

1. The Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions: E.O. 13599, section
217(a) of the TRA, section 560.211 of the ITSR; and

2. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and its president under section 105(c) of
CISADA: Section 1248 of IFCA.

C. Correspondent and Payable-through Account Sanctions

After Implementation Day, FFIs may be subject to correspondent or payable-through account
secondary sanctions for:

1. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction with designated Iranian
financial institutions that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1245(d)
of NDAA 2012);

2. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian
persons that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1247(a) of IFCA);

3. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction or providing significant
financial services for any other person on the SDN List with the “[IFSR]”
identifying tag (i.e., the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and any of its
designated officials, agents, or affiliates; individuals and entities designated
pursuant to E.O. 13382 in connection with Iran’s proliferation of WMD or their
means of delivery; and individuals and entities designated pursuant to E.O. 13224
in connection with Iran’s support for international terrorism) (section 104(c)(2)(E)
of CISADA);

4. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or
transfer to or from Iran of significant goods and services used in connection with
the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran where the transactionsinvolve persons who remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1244(d)(2) of
IFCA); or

5. Knowingly conducting or facilitating a significant financial transaction for the
sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals
such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes
that have been determined pursuant to section 1245(e)(3) of IFCA to be used as
described in that section if the transactions involve (i) persons on the SDN List;
(ii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA
that have not been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to
paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231 and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases
in which the procurement channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of
materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or
transferred, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly,
for use in connection with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section
1245(c) of IFCA).

D. Menu-based Sanctions

After Implementation Day, menu-based secondary sanctions continue to attach to:

1. Persons who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or services in support of: the IRGC or any of
its officials, agents, or affiliates blocked pursuant to IEEPA; persons that engage
in significant transactions with (i) any of the foregoing or (ii) persons subject to
financial sanctions pursuant to the UNSCRs that impose sanctions with respect to
Iran, or a person acting for or on behalf of, or owned or controlled by, such person
(section 302(a) of the TRA);

2. Non-U.S. persons who engage in transactions or activities described in sections
1244(d)(1) and 1246(a) of IFCA if the transactions involve persons on the SDN
List; and

3. Non-U.S. persons who sell, supply, or transfer directly or indirectly to or from
Iran graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
software for integrating industrial processes that have been determined pursuant
to section 1245(e)(3) of IFCA to be used as described in that section if the
transactions involve (i) persons on the SDN List; (ii) the sale, supply, or transfer
of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA that have not been approved by
the procurement channel established pursuant to paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231
and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which the procurement
channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in
section 1245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly, for use in connection
with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section 1245(a) of IFCA).

E. Non-Proliferation Sanctions

On Transition Day, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to
terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the nuclear proliferation-related statutory
sanctions set forth in paragraph 4.9 of Annex II of the JCPOA, including sanctions under the
Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related
commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with
the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. The JCPOA does not address the application of a number of generally-
applicable non-proliferation statutes related to transfers of proliferation-sensitive equipment and
technology, or statutes that provide for sanctions for activities that would be outside the scope of
the JCPOA.

F. Terrorism List Sanctions

Iran remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under relevant laws (section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act; section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act; and section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act), and the JCPOA does not alter that designation. A number of different
sanctions laws and restrictions are keyed to this designation, including restrictions on foreign
assistance (22 U.S.C. § 2371), a ban on defense exports and sales (22 U.S.C. § 2780), controls on
exports of certain sensitive technology and dual-use items (50 U.S.C. App. § 2405), and various
financial and other restrictions.

Posted with Blogsy