ABSALAN, Parviz (Arabic: پرویز آبسالان), Zahedan, Iran; DOB 11 Aug 1964; POB Zabol, Sistan and Baluchistan Province; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; National ID No. 3670287000 (Iran); Birth Certificate Number 01764 (Iran); Deputy Commander of IRGC Salman Corps of Sistan and Baluchistan Province (individual) [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS). 
 
ADINEHVAND, Salman (Arabic: سلمان آدینه وند) (a.k.a. ADINEH VAND, Salman (Arabic: سلمان آدینه وند); a.k.a. ADINEH-VAND, Salman), Tehran, Iran; DOB 10 May 1980; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Commander of the LEF Tehran Police Relief Unit (individual) [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN). 
 
AGHAMIRI, Seyyed Mohammad Amin (Arabic: سید محمد امین آقامیری) (a.k.a. AGHAMIRI, Seyed Mohammad Amin), Iran; DOB 21 Sep 1986; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport E54650560 (Iran) expires 23 Sep 2026; National ID No. 0081673205 (Iran); Secretary of Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace (individual) [IRAN-TRA] [IRAN-EO13846] (Linked To: SUPREME COUNCIL OF CYBERSPACE). 
 
GOSHTASBI, Amanollah (Arabic: امان الله گشتاسبی) (a.k.a. GARSHASBI, Amanollah; a.k.a. GOSHTASBI, Amanolah (Arabic: امان الله گشتاسبی); a.k.a. GOSHTASBI, Amanulah; a.k.a. GOSHTASBI, Amanullah), Iran; DOB 21 Mar 1965 to 20 Mar 1966; POB Gachsaran, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmed Province, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Deputy Inspector of the IRGC Ground Forces (individual) [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS). 
 
SEYEDOSHOHADA, Ahmad Khadem (Arabic: اﺣﻤﺪ ﺧﺎﺩﻡ ﺴﻴﺪﺍﻟﺸﻬﺪﺍ) (a.k.a. DANESH PAZHU, Ahmad Khadem (Arabic: اﺣﻤﺪ خادم دانش پژو); a.k.a. KADEM, Ahmad; a.k.a. KHADEM, Ahmad; a.k.a. SAYYEDOSHOHADA, Ahmad Khadem; a.k.a. SEYED AL-SHOHADA, Ahmad Khadem), Khuzestan, Iran; Lorestan, Iran; Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Iran; DOB 27 Apr 1959; POB Shushtar, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; National ID No. 1881506428 (Iran); Commander of Karbala IRGC Operational Base (individual) [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS). 

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Senior Iranian Officials Overseeing Violent Protest Suppression and Censorship

April 24, 2023

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four senior officials of the Law Enforcement Forces of Iran (LEF) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the primary Iranian security forces responsible for the regime’s brutal suppression of the protests that broke out in September 2022 following the arrest and death of Mahsa Jina Amini while in the custody of Iran’s Morality Police. OFAC is also taking action against the new Secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), the authority responsible for Iran’s cyberspace policy and blockage of popular websites. Today’s action is being taken in coordination with the United Kingdom, which is also imposing similar sanctions on senior Iranian security officials.

“The Iranian people deserve freedom of expression without the threat of violent retaliation and censorship from those in power,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “Along with our key allies and partners, such as the United Kingdom, the United States will continue to take action against those responsible for the regime’s violent repression and censorship.”

OFAC has imposed 11 rounds of sanctions actions targeting the Iranian regime and its security elements and officials that are involved in brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrations since nationwide protests began in September 2022. Today’s designations are pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13553, which authorizes the imposition of sanctions on certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran, and E.O. 13846, which authorizes sanctions on persons who engage in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran.

OFAC designated the IRGC and the LEF pursuant to E.O. 13553 on June 9, 2011, for being responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses in Iran since the June 2009 disputed presidential election. The IRGC is also designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 and E.O. 13224.  OFAC designated Iran’s SCC on January 12, 2018, for engaging in censorship and inhibiting free expression in Iran, pursuant to E.O. 13628, which was later revoked and superseded by E.O. 13846.

The Department of State is also taking action today to impose visa restrictions pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), section 212(a)(3)(C), on 11 additional Iranian government officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the abuse, detention, or killing of peaceful protestors or inhibiting their rights to freedom of expression or peaceful assembly.

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS LEADERS

Parviz Absalan (Absalan) is the Deputy Commander of the IRGC Salman Corps of Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The Salman Corps were involved in the violent suppression of protests in Sistan and Baluchistan, which resulted in some of the highest casualties nationwide following the outbreak of protests in September 2022.

Amanollah Goshtasbi (Goshtasbi) is the Deputy Inspector of the IRGC’s Ground Forces. He was previously the Commander of the IRGC’s Salman Corps, during which forces under his command are alleged to have opened fire on Baluch citizens on multiple occasions, leading to several deaths.

Ahmed Khadem Seyedoshohada (Seyedoshohada) is a Brigadier General in the IRGC’s Ground Forces and has been Commander of the IRGC’s Karbala Operational Base since at least 2020. During the protests in 2022, IRGC troops under his command allegedly used live ammunition against protesters in the towns of Khorramabad, Lorestan province and Izeh, Khuzestan province.

Absalan, Goshtasbi, and Seyedoshohada are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted, or purported to act, for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC, an entity designated pursuant to E.O. 13553.

LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES LEADER

Salman Adinehvand (Adinehvand) is the current Commander of the Tehran Police Relief Unit of Iran’s LEF, the primary security organization in charge of crowd control and protest suppression. Adinehvand’s unit was directly responsible for the violent suppression of protests in Tehran in September and October 2022, during which dozens of protestors were killed by security forces using live ammunition.

Adinehvand is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the LEF, an entity designated pursuant to E.O. 13553.

SUPREME COUNCIL ON CYBERSPACE LEADER

Seyyed Mohammad Amin Aghamiri (Aghamiri) is the new Secretary of Iran’s SCC, the centralized authority regarding policymaking in the realm of cyberspace. The SCC is responsible for Iran’s blockage of popular online news and communications platforms and has also used digital technology to spy on and harass journalists and regime dissidents.

Aghamiri is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13846 for having acted, or purported to act, for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the SCC, an entity designated pursuant to E.O. 13628, which was revoked and superseded by E.O. 13846.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons are prohibited.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions or subject to an enforcement action. Furthermore, unless an exception applies, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the persons designated today could be subject to U.S. sanctions.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

U.S. Treasury Department Press Release

Designating Iranian Officials in Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuses Or Censorship in Iran

PRESS STATEMENT

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE

APRIL 24, 2023

The United States condemns Iran’s continued human rights abuses and remains committed to supporting the people of Iran as they face the brutality of the Iranian regime and demand respect for their fundamental freedoms.

Today, the Department of State is taking action to impose visa restrictions pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 212(a)(3)(C) on 11 Iranian government officials, who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the abuse, detention or killing of peaceful protestors or inhibiting their rights to freedom of expression or peaceful assembly.

The Department of the Treasury is also designating four individuals in connection with serious human rights abuses in Iran.  All four officials are directly linked to LEF and IRGC units that were implicated in the violent suppression of protests in Iran.  Treasury is also designating the Secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, a U.S. designated entity.

Today’s actions were taken in close coordination with the United Kingdom — the U.S. will continue to coordinate with our allies and partners to promote accountability for the Iranian regime’s continued human rights abuses.

Today’s sanctions actions are being taken pursuant to Executive Order 13553 and Executive Order 13846.

U.S. State Department Press Release

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Targets Actors Facilitating Illicit DPRK Financial Activity in Support of Weapons Programs

April 24, 2023

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three individuals for providing support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) through illicit financing and malicious cyber activity. The DPRK launders stolen virtual currency and deploys information technology (IT) workers to fraudulently obtain employment to generate revenue in virtual currency to support the regime and its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Today’s actions have been taken in close coordination with the Republic of Korea.

“The DPRK’s use of illicit facilitation networks to access the international financial system and generate revenue using virtual currency for the regime’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction(WMD) and ballistic missile programs directly threatens international security,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States and our partners are committed to safeguarding the international financial system and preventing its use in the DPRK’s destabilizing activities, especially in light of the DPRK’s three launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) this year alone.”

SUPPORT TO DPRK MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY

Wu Huihui (Wu) is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13722 for providing material support to the Lazarus Group, which was previously designated pursuant to that same authority on September 13, 2019.  Cheng Hung Man (Cheng) is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13722 for providing material support to Wu.

The Lazarus Group targets institutions such as financial, manufacturing, publishing, media, entertainment, and international shipping companies, as well as government and military and critical infrastructure, using tactics such as cyber espionage, data theft, monetary heists, and destructive malware operations. The group is controlled by the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the DPRK’s primary intelligence bureau and main entity responsible for the country’s malicious cyber activities, and is involved in the trade of DPRK arms. On March 23, 2022, the Lazarus Group carried out the largest virtual currency heist to date, stealing almost $620 million in virtual currency from a blockchain project linked to the online game Axie Infinity.

Since at least late 2017, the DPRK has been engaged in virtual currency thefts and fraud schemes to generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. According to public reporting, DPRK cyber actors were able to steal an estimated $1.7 billion worth of virtual currency through various hacks in 2022 alone. The DPRK often launders the stolen virtual currency through a complicated process to convert stolen virtual currency into fiat currency. The DPRK leverages a network of over-the-counter (OTC) virtual currency traders to convert crypto currency into fiat currency. Frequently, DPRK actors use these networks of OTC traders, including People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based OTC traders, to conduct transactions on their behalf to avoid detection by financial institutions or competent authorities.

Wu is a PRC-based OTC virtual currency trader who facilitated the conversion of virtual currency stolen by DPRK actors working with the Lazarus Group to fiat currency. In 2021, Wu processed multiple transactions that converted millions of dollars’ worth of virtual currency into fiat currency for DPRK cyber actors. Cheng is a Hong Kong-based OTC trader who worked with Wu to remit payment to companies in exchange for virtual currency. Cheng utilized front companies to enable DPRK actors to bypass countering illicit finance requirements at financial institutions and access the U.S. financial system. Cheng worked with Wu and other virtual currency OTC traders who facilitate conversion of virtual currency stolen by DPRK hackers into fiat currency for use by the DPRK government.

ILLICIT ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

OFAC is also designating Sim Hyon Sop (Sim) pursuant to E.O. 13382, for acting for or on behalf of the Korea Kwangson Banking Corp (KKBC), an entity previously designated under E.O. 13382, an authority that targets proliferators of WMD and their supporters.  KKBC was designated for providing financial services in support of both Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, entities previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382. 

Sim is a KKBC Deputy Representative who recently relocated to Dandong, China. The DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank, also previously designated under E.O. 13382, is KKBC’s parent company. According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the DPRK uses and maintains a network of financial representatives, primarily in the PRC, who operate as agents for DPRK financial institutions. In this capacity, these representatives orchestrate schemes, set up shell companies, and manage surreptitious bank accounts to move and disguise illicit funds and finance the DPRK’s WMD and ballistic missile programs. In his position with KKBC, Sim has coordinated millions of dollars in financial transfers for the DPRK.  

The DPRK also generates revenue through the deployment of IT workers who fraudulently obtain employment in the technology and virtual currency industries. The DPRK maintains a workforce of thousands of highly skilled IT workers around the world to generate revenue that contributes to its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. Since September 2021, Sim has received tens of millions of dollars in virtual currency. That virtual currency was, in part, derived from DPRK individuals unknowingly hired by U.S.-based companies to provide IT development work. These DPRK IT workers typically use fake personas to apply for jobs at these companies. When the IT workers obtain employment, they are known to request to be paid in virtual currency and send the majority of their salaries through a complicated laundering pattern to funnel these illegally obtained funds back to the DPRK. Sim appears to be receiving money from IT development work being fraudulently conducted by DPRK individuals abroad and, separately, directing OTC traders, including Wu and Cheng, to send payments to front companies with funds derived from stolen virtual currency, so that those front companies can make payments in fiat currency for goods, such as tobacco and communications devices, on behalf of the DPRK regime. 

Today’s action is the result of OFAC’s ongoing collaboration with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On April 18, 2023, a federal indictment was returned in the U.S District Court for the District of Columbia for Wu, Cheng, and Sim. Today’s action was also closely coordinated with the Republic of Korea, which is also designating Sim for his illicit activities

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, pursuant to E.O. 13722 and E.O. 13382, all property and interests in property of the persons named above that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897.

For additional information regarding the DPRK’s IT workers, see the May 16, 2022, Guidance on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Information Technology Workers.

U.S. Treasury Department Press Release

U.S. Department of State Announces Reward Offers for Information Leading to the Arrests and/or Convictions of Three Transnational Criminals Violating DPRK Sanctions

PRESS STATEMENT

MATTHEW MILLER, DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON

APRIL 25, 2023

Today, the U.S. Department of State, through the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP), is announcing a reward offer of up to $5,000,000 for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) national Sim Hyon-Sop.  We are also offering separate reward offers of up to $500,000 each for information leading to the arrests and/or convictions of People’s Republic of China (PRC) nationals Han Linlin and Qin Gouming.  As part of a whole-of-government action, these three individuals were charged by the Department of Justice with various criminal offenses, and Sim was sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

According to the Department of Justice’s indictment, Qin, Han, and Sim used multiple front companies to purchase tobacco products and other goods for North Korean customers and laundered U.S. dollars for these shipments. The tobacco imported by Qin, Han, and others into the DPRK was used to manufacture counterfeit cigarettes, the sales of which benefitted the DPRK regime.

Additionally, the United States, in close coordination with the Republic of Korea, has also sanctioned three individuals: Wu Huihui, Cheng Hung Man, and the aforementioned Sim, for providing support to the DPRK’s network of illicit financing and malicious cyber activities. The DPRK malicious cyber actors target companies around the world to steal money for Pyongyang’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. The United States will continue to act to prevent DPRK activities that threaten regional and international peace and security.  We also remain committed to working with our close partners and allies to disrupt the DPRK’s illicit financial and revenue generating activities worldwide.

This sanctions action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13722, which prohibits certain transactions with respect to the DPRK, and Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of WMD and their supporters.  For more information about this designation, please see the Department of the Treasury’s press release . For more information on the rewards program, visit the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program home page.

For more information on the program visit the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program home page.

U.S. State Department Press Release